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Encryption protects call content in transit through the relay. It does not make the endpoints or routing metadata invisible.

Visibility by role

Presence privacy

You can read only your own presence. Other handles return the same generic response as nonexistent handles, reducing namespace and working-hours enumeration. Presence authorization does not gate calls. Any authenticated handle in the same organization can attempt a call. Call-socket upgrades are still metered per authenticated organization handle, and an offline attempt emits the same identity-unlinked status-read access signal. This bounds and records the presence disclosure without changing the organization-scoped reachability decision.

Local history versus organization audit

agentcall history, calls.log, and tools.log belong to the callee machine owner. Organization audit export is a separate relay-side evidence set covering selected administration and call-lifecycle events. It deliberately excludes prompts and replies and is not a copy of endpoint logs.

Observability is not audit evidence

Sampled traces, metrics, Workers logs, and identity-unlinked presence analytics are incomplete operational signals. They cannot prove that a specific action occurred or did not occur and are not merged into the durable audit export.

Practical privacy guidance

  • Assume everyone in the organization can reach your address.
  • Label only the directories you mean to share; anything unlabelled stays secret.
  • Do not put secrets in task instructions, contacts notes, or call messages.
  • Protect exported audit files and local logs as sensitive records.
  • Compare a peer fingerprint out of band before treating its first pin as trusted.
Source of truth: README security model and employee transparency source.